Our research quantifies risks and estimates costs and benefits of solutions.
Primary research capabilities are a distinctive competency of Resilient Societies. We use quantitative techniques wherever possible. Our analytic tools include statistical correlation of initiating factors and observed impacts, comparative risk analysis, probabilistic risk assessment, cost-benefit ratios, and sensitivity scenarios.
Protecting the U.S. Electric Grid from Electromagnetic Pulse
In a first of a kind report, "Estimating the Cost of Protecting the U.S. Electric Grid from Electromagnetic Pulse," we model the cost of protecting control rooms, generation plants, and substations in the high-voltage portion of the U.S. electric grid and find this cost can be affordable when part of a ten-year mitigation program.
Protecting U.S. Electric Grid Communications from Electromagnetic Pulse
Protecting utility communication systems from electromagnetic pulse effects will increase electric grid resilience to a wide spectrum of hazards including cyber-attack, physical attack, and loss of operational continuity during pandemic.
Read about proposed solutions in our report, "Protecting U.S. Electric Grid Communications from Electromagnetic Pulse."
Read about proposed solutions in our report, "Protecting U.S. Electric Grid Communications from Electromagnetic Pulse."
Potential North Korean Atmospheric Nuclear Tests
On November 30, 2017 we released a working paper, "High Consequence Scenarios for North Korean Atmospheric Nuclear Tests."In this working paper, we provide a brief appraisal of the nature of the EMP effects and how technical experts might proactively prepare for atmospheric nuclear tests. To aid government policymakers, we consider five atmospheric test scenarios conducted via ballistic missile that North Korea might pursue, taking into account potential trajectories, detonation altitudes, and impacts on humans and critical infrastructure.
Long-Term Backup Power for Spent Fuel Pools at Nuclear Power Plants
A spent fuel pool at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station near San Clemente, California. Photo courtesy of NRC.
Our entry into policy-based research was PRM-50-96, a Petition for Rulemaking to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that proposed long-term backup power for spent fuel pools at nuclear power plants. Using geo-spatial techniques, we cross-referenced nuclear power plant locations with regions vulnerable to outage from solar storms. Our analysis quantified likely human impacts of spent fuel fires and resulting radiation plumes. PRM-50-96 included a Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment and cost-benefit scenarios for three alternative solutions.
We announced PRM-50-96 at a February 2011 press conference held at the front entrance to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the government agency responsible for the reliability of grid power for nuclear power plants. Our petition turned out to be prescient—only five weeks after our press conference, the disaster at Fukushima, Japan conclusively showed the danger of spent fuel pools without grid power for cooling.
Our analytically rigorous approach in PRM-50-96 persuaded the NRC Commissioners. According to a March 2013 article in Managing Power, "NRC Grants Citizen Petition to Examine Solar Storms," the NRC received 116 rulemaking petitions since the year 2000 but approved only one for rulemaking consideration: ours.
We announced PRM-50-96 at a February 2011 press conference held at the front entrance to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the government agency responsible for the reliability of grid power for nuclear power plants. Our petition turned out to be prescient—only five weeks after our press conference, the disaster at Fukushima, Japan conclusively showed the danger of spent fuel pools without grid power for cooling.
Our analytically rigorous approach in PRM-50-96 persuaded the NRC Commissioners. According to a March 2013 article in Managing Power, "NRC Grants Citizen Petition to Examine Solar Storms," the NRC received 116 rulemaking petitions since the year 2000 but approved only one for rulemaking consideration: ours.
Electric Reliability Risk Index
Using data from multiple databases within the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Resilient Societies conceptualized and computed an Electric Reliability Risk Index (ERRI) for each of the fifty states and Washington D.C. Our trademarked Electric Reliability Risk Index is the percent of electric power reliant on interstate transmission plus the percent of electric power generated by interstate natural gas.
When energy is transported long distances, it is inherently less reliable. As a general pattern, electricity in the United States is generated in less-populated areas and transmitted long distances to metropolitan centers. For example, the Intermountain Power Plant in Delta, Utah supplies power to Los Angeles, California over a transmission line running 600 miles. Power plants located in West Virginia supply the Washington, DC area. Much of New York City's electricity is generated in Midwestern states.
Natural gas production and and transport is also over long distances. Wellheads are concentrated near the Gulf of Mexico and in the Appalachian Mountains; long-distance pipelines bring natural gas hundreds or thousands of miles to places such as California and New England. Increasingly, natural gas pipeline compressors are reliant on electricity from the commercial grid.
The U.S. electric grid's reliance on electricity transmission over long distances and imported natural gas for generation reduces its resilience to a wide range of blackout-initiating events. Local natural gas storage may contribute to a future solution. However, in the near-term it is especially important for grid operators to mitigate and prevent blackouts caused by solar storms, electromagnetic pulse, physical attack, and cyber-attack—their wide-area impact will greatly complicate system restoration.
As our risk index shows, eleven states depend on long-distance electricity and natural gas for half or more of their electricity consumption and therefore are at high risk for long-term blackout caused by natural and man-made disasters. You can download our Electric Reliability Risk Index by clicking on its red hyperlink.
When energy is transported long distances, it is inherently less reliable. As a general pattern, electricity in the United States is generated in less-populated areas and transmitted long distances to metropolitan centers. For example, the Intermountain Power Plant in Delta, Utah supplies power to Los Angeles, California over a transmission line running 600 miles. Power plants located in West Virginia supply the Washington, DC area. Much of New York City's electricity is generated in Midwestern states.
Natural gas production and and transport is also over long distances. Wellheads are concentrated near the Gulf of Mexico and in the Appalachian Mountains; long-distance pipelines bring natural gas hundreds or thousands of miles to places such as California and New England. Increasingly, natural gas pipeline compressors are reliant on electricity from the commercial grid.
The U.S. electric grid's reliance on electricity transmission over long distances and imported natural gas for generation reduces its resilience to a wide range of blackout-initiating events. Local natural gas storage may contribute to a future solution. However, in the near-term it is especially important for grid operators to mitigate and prevent blackouts caused by solar storms, electromagnetic pulse, physical attack, and cyber-attack—their wide-area impact will greatly complicate system restoration.
As our risk index shows, eleven states depend on long-distance electricity and natural gas for half or more of their electricity consumption and therefore are at high risk for long-term blackout caused by natural and man-made disasters. You can download our Electric Reliability Risk Index by clicking on its red hyperlink.
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Adminstration 2012 State Electricity Profiles & Natural Gas Annual; Resilient Societies analysis